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IMPLEMENTATION NEGOTIATION: A 
TRANSACTIONAL SKILL THAT BUILDS ON AND 
TRANSFORMS CLASSIC NEGOTIATION THEORY 
 
Tina L. Stark* 
SUMMARY 
Implementation negotiation is the specialized negotiation in which 
deal lawyers engage after the principals negotiate the business terms of the 
transaction. Classic negotiation principles guide these business term 
negotiations. But once the parties agree, the dynamics, tone, content, and 
purpose of the negotiation change. Parties are no longer looking at 
whether they can find a way to agree. They do agree. Now, the lawyers 
must transform the clients’ bare bones agreed-on business terms into a 
contract that memorializes their joint vision.  
Implementation negotiation theory does not displace classic 
negotiation theory. It simultaneously builds on that theory and its related 
principles and transforms them to work in a different context. 
Importantly, that context requires negotiators to have significant 
specialized knowledge and skills. Specifically, the deal lawyer must know 
not only contract law, but also the law specific to the deal—whether it be 
construction, real estate, securities, or employment law. In addition, the 
deal lawyer must know business, the client’s business, and the implications 
of each business term. Finally, the deal lawyer must excel at risk and 
contract analysis and be more than just a little proficient in drafting.  
This article begins by reviewing classic negotiation principles and 
then explains how implementation negotiation transforms those 
principles, including why BATNA recedes to the background, why 
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seasoned negotiators know the parties’ interests and issues and the 
expected zone of agreement, even before negotiations begin. In addition, 
the article explains why a contract’s first draft anchors all negotiations and 
why contract analysis becomes such a salient skill. The article then details 
the multiple subcategories of implementation negotiation through 
narrative and a series of illustrative, simulated negotiations. It concludes 
by briefly discussing the implications of this new theory of negotiation for 
legal education. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ten years ago, when I spoke at the first Emory Conference, I 
stated that negotiating a dispute differs from negotiating a contract. At 
that time, I urged the Academy to think through those differences and 
how they affected negotiation theory. Today, I return to that topic and 
describe a type of negotiation unique to deals. I’ve dubbed it implementation 
negotiation.  
Before discussing implementation negotiation, I have a clip from 
Pretty Woman1 that vividly portrays how many people think about 
transactional negotiations.  
Characters 
Edward Lewis – played by Richard Gere 
Philip Stuckey – played by Jason Alexander 
James Morse – played by Ralph Bellamy 
This scene takes place inside a conference room 
Stuckey: Mr. Morse, you said this morning you wished to speak to 
Mr. Lewis. Mr. Lewis is now listening. 
Morse: I've reconsidered my position on your acquisition offer . . 
. on one condition. I'm not so concerned about me, but 
the people who are working for me. 
Stuckey: It's not a problem. They'll be taken care of. [Pause] Well, 
then, gentlemen. If we could address ourselves to the 
contracts in front of you. If you look at . . . . 
Lewis: Excuse me, Phil. [Inhales] Gentlemen, I'd like to speak to 
Mr. Morse alone. Thank you. 
                                               
1 PRETTY WOMAN (Touchstone Pictures and Silver Screen Partners IV 1990). 
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Stuckey: All right, gentlemen, you heard the man. Please wait 
outside. 
Lewis: You too, Phil. 
Stuckey: [Chuckles nervously] What do you mean? 
Lewis: I mean I would like to speak to Mr. Morse alone. 
Stuckey: Why does he get to stay? Please, please. I'll be right outside. 
. . . 
[Intentionally omitted] 
Lewis: [Exhales] Mr. Morse, my interests in your company have 
changed. 
Morse: What is it you're after now, Mr. Lewis? 
Lewis: Well, I no longer wish to buy your company and take it 
apart. But I don't want anyone else to, either. And it is still 
extremely vulnerable. So I find myself . . . in unfamiliar 
territory. I wanna help you.  
Morse: Why? 
Lewis: Mr. Morse, I think we can do something very special with 
your company. 
Morse: What about our Navy contracts? 
Lewis: Ah, they weren't dead. Just delayed. I . . . bluffed a little bit. 
Morse: [Chuckles] You're very good at it.  
Lewis: Thank you very much. It's my job. [Chuckles] I think we 
can leave the details up to the others.  
Morse: I find this hard to say without sounding condescending, 
but . . . I'm proud of you. 
Lewis: Thank you. I think we can let in the other suits now. 
[Door opens] - Let's continue the meeting. 
Morse: Come in, gentlemen. Sit down. 
Stuckey: Edward, please, what was this all about? Hmm? 
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Lewis: It's all yours, Phil. Finish it up. 
Stuckey: Hold it. Hold it. These aren't signed! These aren't signed! 
Could someone please tell me what the f*** is going on 
here? 
Morse: Mr. Lewis and I are going to build ships together. Great 
big ships. 
II. DEAL NEGOTIATIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM 
IMPLEMENTATION NEGOTIATION 
Although this clip parodies a negotiation, it actually does a good 
job introducing transactional negotiations because it reflects the reality 
that they occur in two stages. 
The first stage, of course, is the deal negotiation, when principals 
negotiate the business terms of the transaction. Lawyers may or may not 
participate in deal negotiations. Most lawyers would probably prefer to be 
included for multiple reasons. First, they want to safeguard their clients 
against inadvertently agreeing to a term that will be problematic. Second, 
some lawyers believe they can be useful in backstopping their principals 
on matters where the law and business intersect.  
In any event, at some point, the principals will agree and writeup 
a term sheet, or they will agree to disagree and walk away from the 
negotiations. Classic negotiation theory and principles guide these 
negotiations. 
If the parties agree, the dynamics, tone, content, and purpose of 
the negotiation change. Parties are no longer looking at whether they can 
find a way to agree. They do agree. Now, the lawyers must transform the 
clients’ bare bones agreed-on business terms into a contract that 
memorializes their joint vision. At the same time, the lawyers must 
advance their respective clients’ interests while reducing their risks. They 
must close the deal or risk the opprobrium of being called a deal killer. 
This is implementation negotiation.  
Implementation negotiation theory does not displace classic 
negotiation theory. It simultaneously builds on that theory and transforms 
it to work in a different context.  
Importantly, that context requires negotiators to have significant 
specialized knowledge and skills. Specifically, the deal lawyer must know 
the law, not only contract law, but also the law specific to the deal—
whether it be construction, real estate, securities, or employment law. In 
addition, the deal lawyer must know business, the client’s business, and 
the implications of each business term. Finally, the deal lawyer must excel 
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at risk and contract analysis and be more than just a little proficient in 
drafting.  
Implementation negotiation cannot be divorced from drafting. A 
business term won during the principals’ negotiation turns into a loss if 
the contract doesn’t reflect the bargain accurately. I will elaborate on this 
point a bit later. 
At this point, I’m going to give you a brief roadmap for the rest of 
the presentation. First, I will review classic principles of negotiation. I will 
then discuss how implementation negotiation affects the use of these 
principles. I will also explain how implementation negotiation is itself 
composed of different kinds of negotiation.  
III. THE CLASSIC NEGOTIATION PRINCIPLES 
A. BATNA 
The first negotiation principle I’ll discuss is the all-important 
BATNA. BATNA is an acronym for the best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement. BATNA is what a party will do if negotiations fail. In settlement 
negotiations, the alternative is generally litigation. That’s why negotiation 
is sometimes said to take place in the shadow of the law. If all else fails, the 
parties will end up in court, where case law rules. 
Classic negotiation theory regards each party’s knowledge of its 
BATNA and estimates of the other side’s BATNA as critical to a 
successful negotiation. Only then can a party know whether to accept or 
reject an offer. 
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B. Interests, Issues, Positions, and the Zone of 
Agreement 
The next four classic principles of negotiation theory compose a 
hierarchy. We will start with the broadest principle. 
 
At the top are interests. An interest is something that is important 
to a party. For example, a prospective executive may worry about financial 
security. 
Next are issues. An issue is a specific question or topic that the 
parties are discussing. Salary is a common issue for a company and a 
prospective executive. 
The third principle is positions. A position is a party’s specific 
proposal with respect to a specific issue. Again, in the employer/employee 
context, the prospective executive may take the position that she is entitled 
to $100,000. 
By aggregating these principles, we can make the general statement 
that negotiators stake out positions on multiple issues to achieve their interests. 
We can particularize that generalization using the examples from 
the definitions. 
A prospective executive asks for $100,000 (a 
position) as salary (an issue) to achieve financial security (an 
interest). 
The final classic principle in this hierarchy is the zone of agreement. 
This is where the parties’ ultimate positions—what they are willing to 
do—overlap. It represents possible resolutions of the negotiation. The 
Interests of the parties 
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next diagram depicts the zone of agreement in a hypothetical salary 
negotiation between an executive and a company. 
 
Imagine that the prospective executive has asked for $100,000 but 
is willing to accept $80,000. The rectangle with the vertical lines represents 
that dollar range.  
The company, however, has countered the $100,000 request with 
an offer of $70,000 but is willing to go as high as $90,000. The rectangle 
with the horizontal lines represents that dollar range. 
The overlap amount is the cross-hatched square, and it’s a $10,000 
range between $80,000 and $90,000. That’s the zone of agreement. Where 
in that zone the parties end-up will be a matter of negotiation. 
This salary negotiation is a simple distributive negotiation. In a 
complex deal negotiation, the zone of agreement could depend on 
multiple factors, and, therefore, that could lead to an integrative 
agreement. 
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C. Anchoring Effect 
The final classic negotiating principle I’ll discuss today is the 
anchoring effect. 
Anchoring is a psychological concept. It describes a cognitive bias; 
specifically, a person’s tendency in decision-making to give 
disproportionate weight to the first piece of information the person learns.  
So, for example, in the negotiation context, suppose a publisher 
offers a first-time author an advance against royalties of $50,000. Even if 
the author had intended to ask for an advance of $150,000, the cognitive 
bias of the anchoring effect will induce to the author to make counter-
offers relative to the $50,000. Negotiations will appear successful based 
on how much larger the advance is than $50,000. The author will perceive 
a 20% increase as a win, even if he could have negotiated a 50% increase. 
In contrast, if the author had asked for an advance of $150,000, 
that number would have become the anchor, and the author would 
measure success by how much or how little he had to give away.  
To state the anchoring effect succinctly, success is relative. 
Because of the implications of the anchoring effect, sophisticated 
deal negotiators often spend significant time strategizing over whether to 
make a first offer and what it should be. 
IV. THE CLASSIC NEGOTIATION PRINCIPLES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTATION NEGOTIATION 
With that, I’d like to move away from pure theory and look at how 
deal lawyers use these negotiating principles in implementation 
negotiation.  
A. BATNA 
Let’s begin by contrasting the role of BATNA in deal negotiation 
and implementation negotiation. 
When no deal yet exists, BATNA always casts its shadow over deal 
negotiations. But once parties agree, BATNA loses its primacy. Parties no 
longer need to worry about alternatives to an agreement. They have one. 
What they need is a contract that implements the business terms.  
That is not to say that BATNA disappears. Rather, it recedes into 
the background and only comes to the fore in limited circumstances; for 
example, when the parties fail to address a significant deal term, 
understand an agreed-on-term differently, or need to restructure the deal. 
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Indeed, some lawyers believe that a deal is cratering if a client is discussing 
BATNA during an implementation negotiation. 
B. The First Draft, Anchoring, and Contract Analysis 
An implementation negotiation begins on the delivery to a party 
of the other party’s first draft of the contract. That draft becomes the 
starting gate for all subsequent negotiations. It is the first offer, and that 
offer pertains to all matters great and small. 
The breadth and detail of the offer gives the drafter and the client 
significant negotiating leverage. Within the bounds of ethics, a lawyer can 
draft each provision in ways that favor the client. This advantage achieves 
additional significance when the parties did not address an issue directly, 
but the contract needs to. Then, the drafter is even freer to craft a 
provision to the client’s advantage. In addition, the drafter gains the 
flexibility not to address an issue that might likely be resolved to her client’s 
detriment. Moreover, each word or its absence anchors that issue and 
becomes untethered only if the other side succeeds in negotiating it away. 
Let me expand on this a bit. When a lawyer receives a draft from 
the other side, she must perform contract analysis. Contract analysis is 
much more than reading words on the page. The lawyer must understand 
the implications of the words from a business, legal, and practical 
perspective. 
To analyze a contract requires a lawyer to disassemble it and to 
look at each provision and, when doing so, to ask and answer at least seven 
questions:2  
• What is the business purpose of the provision?  
• Does the provision properly incorporate the agreed-on 
business deal?  
• Can the provision better protect the client and reduce the 
risk?  
                                               
2 Based on Tina L. Stark, Drafting Contracts: How and Why Lawyers Do What They Do 
424-425 (2d ed. 2014 Wolters Kluwer). 
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• Can the provision further advance the client’s goals? 
• Are there business issues? 
• Are there legal issues? 
• Are there drafting issues? 
Contract analysis differs from contract interpretation. Contract 
interpretation assumes an ambiguity or a lack of clarity. Contract analysis 
precedes this determination. It asks the questions that provide the insight 
into the provision’s meaning and effect. Contract analysis may well lead a 
lawyer to conclude that a provision is ambiguous, but it goes way beyond 
and asks, “What business, legal, and drafting issues are hidden here?”  
Drafters can hide issues in multiple ways. For example, a drafter 
can quite often effectively trap a reviewing lawyer by not addressing a 
possibly contentious issue. Reviewing lawyers tend to laser focus on the 
specific words on the page. Silence is harder to find. That’s why thinking 
through a deal’s business and legal issues before reviewing a contract 
becomes imperative. If a lawyer doesn’t find the issue embedded on page 
forty-five or notice a key provision’s absence, he has lost the negotiation 
on that issue and harmed the client. A lawyer cannot win what he never 
negotiated, and he cannot negotiate what he did not find. The absent 
business or legal term was anchored when the other lawyer drafted the 
contract and omitted it. Unfortunately for the reviewing lawyer and the 
client, it may remain so. 
The anchoring effect makes expertise in contract analysis an 
indispensable skill for any lawyer conducting an implementation 
negotiation. Only by doing this work can a lawyer discover a contract’s 
business, legal, and drafting nuances and the associated negotiation topics.  
There are at least three take-aways here. 
• First, writing the first draft anchors all negotiations to the 
provisions in or absent from that document. All counter-
offers and results are relative to that anchor. 
• Second, whether a client characterizes its lawyer’s 
implementation negotiation as successful depends heavily 
on that lawyer’s contract analysis skill—a skill law schools 
don’t teach as part of classic negotiation theory.  
• Third, anchoring in implementation negotiation 
establishes the default contract provision (or its omission), 
absent contract analysis and subsequent negotiation. 
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A final word about a contract’s first draft. Contrary to the writing 
of some commentators, lawyers rarely jockey for the right to author a 
contract’s first draft. Industry custom generally dictates who the drafter is. 
Typically, it is the lawyer whose client has the most financial risk. 
Therefore, barring unusual circumstances, the lawyers for employers, 
landlords, and lenders write the first draft.  
The convention with respect to acquisitions varies, depending on 
the asset being purchased. With respect to real estate purchases and the 
purchase of goods and services, the seller’s lawyer typically writes the first 
draft. With respect to business acquisitions, the manner of sale determines 
who becomes the drafter. Generally, in a negotiated acquisition, the 
buyer’s lawyer writes the first draft (including the purchase agreement for 
any real estate). But if the seller is auctioning the target, the seller’s lawyer 
typically writes the acquisition agreement’s first draft. 
C. Interests, Issues, Positions, and Zones of Agreement 
Now, I’d like to return to interests, issues, positions, and zones of 
agreement.  
As you know, each type of contract has business and legal issues 
that recur. That means that, before a lawyer begins an implementation 
negotiation, he generally already knows how each party’s role in the 
transaction affects that party’s specific interests, issues, and likely 
positions. For example, in the implementation negotiation of an 
employment agreement, clients in the employer role will typically share 
common interests and assert similar positions with respect to specific 
issues. Of course, businesses differ, and deal-specific facts will always 
affect all aspects of an implementation negotiation, whether it be interests, 
issues, or positions. 
Let me be a bit more concrete with the example of an employment 
agreement implementation negotiation. So, in that context, the client in 
the employer role generally wants to hire and retain a first-class work 
force—an interest. But that interest in a high-quality work force leads 
almost inevitably to the contentious issue of the scope of the employer’s 
right to terminate the prospective employee for cause.  
Without much research, someone can predict the positions the 
parties will assert. The company will want broad rights to terminate 
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employment. In contrast, the employee will want to restrict the scope of 
reasons that permit termination for cause. 
Because this issue and others appear in almost all employment 
agreement negotiations, experienced employment lawyers also know the 
common ways that lawyers resolve these issues. They may regularly rely 
on a half dozen or more. I have termed these common resolutions, in the 
context of implementation negotiation, the expected zone of agreement. The 
expected zone of agreement comprises the multiplicity of possible 
resolutions and all their variations—both business and legal. 
Expected is the salient word. When negotiating a specific issue, a 
deal lawyer need not pluck a resolution from the array of choices in an 
expected zone of agreement. Lawyers may well resolve the issue outside 
the zone. Who the parties are, their relative bargaining power, the specifics 
of a party’s business, and other deal-specific facts may well lead to a 
creative resolution outside the expected zone of agreement.  
The repeated confluence of interests, issues, positions, and the 
expected zone of agreement puts a premium on a lawyer’s knowledge. A 
lawyer can’t propose a resolution that she doesn’t know exists. It takes 
years of experience to acquire this knowledge and, equally as important, 
to know how to exploit it. Junior lawyers can do their best to prepare for 
an implementation negotiation by reading a treatise, but the experienced 
practitioner will have the advantage—not because of negotiation prowess 
(although that matters) but because of superior knowledge and greater 
experience. 
Indeed, the neophyte lawyer petrifies the sophisticated client on 
the other side of the table. Negotiations become long and expensive when 
an unexperienced lawyer repeatedly asks for unreasonable changes. An 
atypical request is not per se unreasonable. Usually, a lawyer does not 
intend to be unreasonable. Instead, she stakes out an untenable position 
because she just doesn’t understand that her requests do not reflect legal 
or business realities or common practice. 
It is not unknown for a lender to require an unsophisticated 
borrower to retain sophisticated counsel, even if that makes a point harder 
to win. In the long-run, the negotiation will be more efficient, and the 
parties will finish the negotiation with a contract that works.  
This time, the take-away is that a lawyer’s success in 
implementation negotiation depends heavily on nuanced, foundation 
knowledge that is both general and transaction-specific.  
To have foundation knowledge, a lawyer must know the law, 
business, contract analysis, risk analysis, negotiation theory, and drafting. 
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She must also understand the classic negotiation principles and their role, 
as transformed, in implementation negotiation. Moreover, in the context 
of a specific implementation negotiation, the lawyer must understand the 
business deal, the client’s business, and the client’s position on each 
business and legal issue. Finally, she must know how to resolve those 
issues through negotiation and drafting.  
Here, I’m going to go on a bit of a tangent. A common conviction 
about implementation negotiation is that it does not involve the law. 
That’s wrong. Although deal lawyers don’t regularly cite case law when 
they draft contracts, they negotiate and draft using the infrastructure that 
is the law to memorialize a contract’s business terms. That means they 
must know the applicable law before they begin to negotiate. That’s not to 
say a deal lawyer never conducts research. But if a deal lawyer had to 
research 85% of a contract’s provisions in a 120-page agreement, no one 
could ever complete an implementation negotiation. Although you can’t 
see the case law in an implementation negotiation, it is omnipresent.  
D. Categories of Implementation Negotiation 
At this point, I would like to showcase various aspects of 
implementation negotiation, each aspect for these purposes being deemed 
a category. To do so, I will either describe the category through narrative 
or illustrate it through a scripted negotiation. 
Although I have discussed implementation negotiation as a unified 
concept, for pedagogic purposes, it can be broken down into categories. 
The categories are not silos, each separate from the next. Instead, they 
resemble colors of a rainbow, each distinctive, each merging into the next, 
together composing the entirety. These categories follow: 
• Business issues. 
• Risk allocation. 
• Expected zone of agreement. 
• Problem-solving. 
• Translation. 
• Legal effect. 
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• Logistics. 
• Contract language. 
Categorizing facets of implementation negotiations artificially 
distills an opaque, multi-factorial, multi-layered thought process. But deal 
lawyers don’t distinguish one category from another. Instead, an 
experienced deal lawyer shifts from translation negotiation to risk 
negotiation to contract language negotiation without consciously 
deliberating, indeed, using the multiple categories virtually simultaneously. 
The parts are the whole. This is especially so with respect to negotiations 
involving business issues, the expected zone of agreement, and problem 
solving. These categories have a greater breadth and often comprise 
multiple other categories. 
This article’s conclusion follows the exposition of the categories. 
V. SIMULATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS3 
A. Business Issues Negotiations 
Although clients negotiate the salient business terms of a 
transaction, business issues remain for the implementation negotiation. A 
careful analysis of a cross-section of agreements reveals that five business 
issues recur in most agreements.4 A general understanding of these issues 
enhances a student’s (or lawyer’s) ability to recognize how each issue 
manifests itself in a specific agreement. The five issues are money, risk, 
control, standards, and endgame. They are the five prongs of the business 
issue framework.  
Clients usually negotiate the salient, distributive monetary issues 
during deal negotiations. Nonetheless, during an implementation 
negotiation, lawyers will often negotiate other kinds of monetary issues: 
indemnity baskets and caps, formulae for royalties in trademark license 
agreements, and the details of earn-out calculations. In addition, lawyers 
                                               
3 The simulations that follow are intentionally amicable. More contentious simulations, 
while ultimately instructive, would detract from their role of demonstrating basic 
concepts. 
4 I first described these business issues in my article Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. 
Legal Educ. 223, 228-232 (2004). This article’s discussion of the five-prong framework 
quotes and paraphrases the somewhat summary treatment in the original article and the 
more detailed exposition in my textbook, Drafting Contracts: How and Why Lawyers Do What 
They Do Ch. 25 (2d ed. Wolters Kluwer 2014). 
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may rely on their practice specific business expertise. For example, a 
lawyer who regularly negotiates royalty agreements for authors might be 
able to advise his client that publishers generally offer royalties for sales in 
a context that the clients didn’t discuss. Those negotiations may return to 
the clients’ purview, but that issue’s negotiation began in the 
implementation negotiation. 
The second prong is risk. Representations and warranties, 
covenants, and conditions are all risk allocation mechanisms. How they 
are negotiated directly affects a client’s risk in a transaction. Risk can also 
manifest itself in multiple other ways in a transaction. First, a contract can 
raise the specter of tort liability—fraudulent inducement, product liability, 
or tortious interference with contract. Second, the provisions can create 
contract risk. For example, a non-compete, liquidated damages, or an 
indemnity provision could be unenforceable. Third, a contract could 
create the risk of statutory liability. A classic example is liability under the 
securities laws. Finally, risk could be inherent in the transaction. Credit risk 
is a salient example. 
Ferreting out risks is not usually a problem for most lawyers. They 
know how to issue spot. But, if that is all that a lawyer does, she will justly 
earn a reputation as a deal killer. To be effective, she must assess the 
probability that a risk will occur, and if it is significant, find a way to control 
it (thereby using one business issue to address another). 
The third business issue is control. In analyzing control as a 
business issue, the initial inquiry must be whether having control is good 
or bad from a client’s perspective. The answer, of course, depends on the 
facts. For example, limited partners enjoy limited liability because they 
exercise no control over the limited partnership’s management. In this 
context, lack of control is good. However, limited partners generally do 
not want to abdicate to the general partner all control over their 
investment. They want the right to decide when and how to protect their 
investment. Therefore, the limited partners will seek as much control as 
the general partner will tolerate and as much as they can accrete without 
becoming general partners under the relevant state law. Thus, control is a 
two-edged sword for limited partners. 
Control is always an issue when there is risk. A deal lawyer must 
not only recognize risk, but also determine how to control or diminish it. 
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The fourth prong of the framework is standards. Virtually every 
word in a contract is a standard. There are both macro and micro 
standards. For example, every representation and warranty establishes a 
standard. If the standard is not met, the recipient of the representation and 
warranty may sue the maker. This is a macro standard. However, that 
macro standard can be changed at the micro level. By changing a word or 
a phrase in a representation and warranty, the standard changes. Are 
property, plant, and equipment in good repair, customary repair, or in 
compliance with industry standards?   
Covenants and conditions are also standards, as is every adjective 
(material contracts) and adverb (promptly deliver). Definitions are also 
standards (how a financial ratio is defined determines the standard of 
financial performance to be incorporated into a loan covenant). A deal 
lawyer adds value by recognizing when a standard is unfavorable to the 
client and by negotiating an alternative that more accurately reflects the 
client’s business goals. 
The last prong is endgame. Every transaction ends. It may end 
happily, unhappily, or in a neutral way. The relationship between a banker 
and its borrower can end with the loan repaid in full (happy) or with the 
borrower in default (unhappy). A neutral termination occurs, for example, 
if a party exercises a right to terminate for convenience. 
The business issues that arise are generally transaction specific. If 
a trademark license agreement ends, the contract must provide for, among 
other things, a mechanism for determining how and when the licensee 
should make the final payments, as well as instructions for what the 
licensee should do with any remaining merchandise. Endgame 
negotiations can be contentious because they often involve money—a 
topic near and dear to most clients’ hearts.  
A deal lawyer’s initial step in a business issue negotiation is 
recognizing its existence. Resolution of the issue depends on her contract 
analysis and problem-solving skills and her ability to negotiate the details 
by ably using the other categories of negotiation. 
To give you more of the flavor of a business issues negotiation, 
the next section defines risk allocation (a subset of the business issue of 
risk) and depicts a negotiation. 
B. Risk Allocation Negotiations 
A risk allocation negotiation is a subset of the general issue of 
risk—a business issue negotiation. At the risk of engaging in circularity, a 
risk allocation negotiation is one in which the parties or their lawyers divide 
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(allocate) the risk between the parties on any given issue. Many negotiators 
consider risk allocation a zero-sum game. 
Because risk is an omnipresent business issue in any transaction, 
its allocation permeates a contract and its negotiation. Indeed, whole 
agreements can be devoted to risk allocation; for example, an indemnity 
agreement. Risk even rears its head in the notice provision: Who takes the 
risk that the notice has not been received? Of course, the risk can become 
obscured by changing the question: When is a notice effective, when given 
or received?  
The risk allocation negotiation that follows depicts the familiar 
wrangling concerning the no litigation representation and warranty in an 
acquisition agreement. It is included as an example of a business issue 
negotiation. 
Factual background5 
The Seller has agreed to sell to the Buyer all the shares of one of 
its wholly owned subsidiaries (the Target). The Buyer’s lawyer drafted the 
first draft of the Stock Purchase Agreement, which contains the following 
representation and warranty: 
 
No Litigation. No litigation is pending or threatened against the 
Target. 
The negotiation between the Seller’s and the Buyer’s lawyers 
follows:  
Seller’s lawyer: Mark, why do you need this no litigation rep and 
warranty?  
Buyer’s lawyer: Sarah, you know this is standard stuff. We 
need to understand what our potential risks are when we own the Target. 
                                               
5 This simulated negotiation draws on a hypothetical negotiation described in my 
textbook, Drafting Contracts: How and Why Lawyers Do What They Do 19-22 (2d ed. Wolters 
Kluwer 2014). 
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A litigation today could be a liability tomorrow. Even if we were to settle 
a case, we could be at risk for a significant sum just for the defense of a 
bogus claim. You know buyers, they don’t want surprises down the road.  
Seller’s lawyer: Well, some assurance is certainly appropriate, 
but this flat rep is a bit much, even for a first draft. It’s completely flat. We 
can’t possibly give it, and you know that. Virtually every company has 
some litigation, and the Target is no exception. So, obviously, we can’t 
give the rep and warranty as drafted. It’s patently false. If my client makes 
it, you could argue there’s an intentional misrepresentation or breach of 
warranty. I would like to change the rep in several ways, but I think we 
should start by scheduling both existing litigations and any known, 
threatened litigations. 
Buyer’s lawyer: That’s reasonable. How about this? 
No Litigation. Except as stated in Schedule 3.14, 
no litigation is pending or threatened against the Target. 
Seller’s lawyer: Thank you. That’s a good start. It reduces 
some of our risk. But, unfortunately, that language doesn’t go far enough. 
The rep also mentions threatened litigation. That’s problematic for us. We 
can certainly schedule any threatened litigation that we know of. But what 
if we don’t know of an existing, threatened litigation against the Target? 
Perhaps someone is claiming that a product malfunctioned and that 
person intends to sue. That’s an unknown, threatened litigation. We don’t 
think that’s a risk you should ask us to assume. We’d like to qualify the rep 
by knowledge so that the contract limits our risk to known, threatened 
litigation. 
Buyer’s lawyer: Fair comment. But for the record, while your 
risk is going down, ours is increasing. The knowledge qualifier means we 
lose any right to sue you if an unknown, threatened litigation becomes an 
actual litigation post-closing. But I understand your point. How about this 
language? Does it address your concerns? 
No Litigation. Except as stated in Schedule 3.14, 
no litigation is pending or, to the Seller’s knowledge, 
threatened against the Target. 
Seller’s lawyer: Yes. That definitely helps. But let’s be realistic. 
So far, this negotiation has gotten us only to the place where most first 
drafts start. You’ve known me long enough to know that the anchoring 
effect is not going to hold me back.  
As I said, we really do appreciate the knowledge qualifier, but let 
me explain why my client has a concern that I hope we can address. As 
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you know, the Seller is a corporation, not a living, breathing human being. 
So, what does “its knowledge” really mean?  
I’m not looking to be philosophical here, just practical. Is the 
Seller’s knowledge just what the CEO knows, or her knowledge and that 
of everyone else down to the employees on the shop floor? The Target 
has over 400 employees. We don’t want to be liable for a body of 
knowledge that’s so great. It’s just too much of a risk with no real way to 
reduce it. We’re not going to survey 400 employees. We propose reducing 
the risk by limiting knowledge to the actual knowledge of the Seller’s top 
three executives. We were thinking of a provision like the following: 
No Litigation. Except as stated in Schedule 3.14, 
no litigation is pending or, to the knowledge of any one or 
more of the Seller’s three executive officers, threatened 
against the Target. 
Buyer’s lawyer: Well, I can understand why your client would 
want that provision. It significantly reduces the Seller’s risk by minimizing 
the body of knowledge for which the Seller is liable. But now I think too 
much risk is being allocated to the Buyer. We can’t be in a position where 
those three officers walk around with their proverbial blinders on, so they 
have plausible deniability about what they didn’t know. Do you remember 
that fiasco back in the 1990s with Enron? That’s the corporation whose 
officers defended themselves by saying they just didn’t know. We don’t 
want to be in that position. 
Seller’s lawyer: I understand. What do you want? 
Buyer’s lawyer: If you want to limit knowledge to the top three 
executives, we’ll need to shift some of the risk back to your client by 
adding an imputed knowledge standard. We can do that by defining 
knowledge. 
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Seller’s lawyer: That works. Let’s move on to issue #147. 
Commentary 
This simulated negotiation oversimplifies the risk allocation 
negotiations that generally take place. Nonetheless, it depicts an 
interaction that acquisition lawyers could have.  
Blended into this risk allocation negotiation were two other 
categories of negotiations. First, the negotiation of the meaning of 
knowledge was a contract language negotiation. In addition, the evolving 
negotiation displayed various resolutions within the expected zone of 
agreement. Indeed, these resolutions are so common that drafters often 
skip directly to one of them in a first draft. Doing so bypasses the 
negotiation, thereby facilitating and expediting the transaction. 
C. Expected Zone of Agreement Negotiations 
An expected zone of agreement negotiation explores the different ways—
largely understood by experienced counsel—to resolve a common issue. 
A specific negotiation may or may not surface multiple options and 
conclude with the parties choosing from the options. Instead, the parties 
may focus on the parameters of one specific outcome to the exclusion of 
the others. The exemplars that follow depict three negotiations of the 
same issue. 
Factual background 
The Bank’s loan arrangement with the Borrower has two parts. 
First, the Bank will make a $25 million revolving line of credit available to 
For the purposes of this representation and warranty, 
“Knowledge” means, cumulatively, 
(a) the actual knowledge of each of A, B, and C and  
(b) the knowledge that each of those officers would 
have had if the officer had conducted a diligent 
investigation. 
2019]                             IMPLEMENTATION NEGOTIATION 
 
 
533 
the Borrower for three years.6 Second, any principal amount outstanding 
at the end of the three years converts to a five-year term loan that the 
borrower repays according to a fixed schedule. 
The Bank and the Borrower have, of course, agreed to other 
business terms, including interest rates, but those terms are not relevant 
for these simulated negotiations. 
The following provision is from the Loan Agreement. Its purpose 
is to ensure that the borrower uses the loan proceeds in the borrower’s 
existing business, the basis on which the bank made its credit decision. 
Certain Fundamental Changes. The Borrower 
shall not, directly or indirectly, acquire all or substantially 
all of the assets of any other Person or any discrete division 
or business of any other Person. 
Variation 1 
Borrower’s lawyer: When I spoke to my client about this 
provision, it was hoping that the Bank could have some flexibility and not 
prohibit all acquisitions. 
Lender's lawyer: What does your client have in mind?  
                                               
6 A revolving line of credit acts as the business equivalent of a credit card with a credit 
limit. With a credit card, an individual may charge the cost of purchases until they 
aggregate to the credit limit. At month’s end, the individual must pay the charges in part 
or in full. Any amounts repaid become available again for new charges. Any amounts 
unpaid are the equivalent of a loan, and the individual must pay interest on the 
outstanding amount.  
Similarly, with a revolving line of credit, a bank provides a borrower with the 
discretionary authority to borrow principal in increments, as needed, up to a maximum 
amount. The borrower also chooses when and whether to repay principal and when and 
whether to borrow again. This flexible arrangement allows the borrower to restrict 
borrowings to times of financial need, thereby minimizing its interest costs. In contrast, 
with a term loan, a borrower borrows the full amount of the loan at the time of signing, 
even if it does not need all the cash at that time. Therefore, it pays interest on amounts it 
doesn’t yet need. 
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Borrower's lawyer: Well, it has been thinking that one way to 
grow the company would be through a strategic acquisition, especially one 
that would significantly improve its long-term profitability. 
Lender's lawyer: I can understand that your client might be 
interested in an acquisition, but the Bank agreed to lend short-term money 
for working capital, a short-term need. Agreeing that the Bank’s funds 
could be used to finance an acquisition creates a whole new credit risk 
profile. An acquisition transforms a revolver intended for short-term 
working capital needs into a long-term loan, money that will be 
outstanding from day one. That's not the basis on which the Loan 
Committee approved the funds. To agree to your client’s request, the Bank 
would need a new credit approval. I’m not sure your client wants to go 
that route. The Loan Committee might well deny your client’s request and 
question the wisdom of its initial approval. 
Borrower’s lawyer: Message received. I’ll take this back to my 
client. 
Variation 2 
Borrower’s lawyer: When I spoke to my client about this 
provision, it was hoping you could have some flexibility and not prohibit 
all acquisitions. 
Lender's lawyer: What does your client have in mind?  
Borrower's lawyer: Well, it's been thinking that one way to 
grow the company would be through a strategic acquisition, especially one 
that would significantly improve its long-term profitability. 
Lender's lawyer: I can understand that your client might be 
interested in an acquisition, but the Bank agreed to lend short-term money 
for working capital, a short-term need. Agreeing that the Bank’s funds can 
be used to finance an acquisition creates a whole new credit risk profile. 
An acquisition transforms a revolver intended for short-term working 
capital needs into a long-term loan, money that will be outstanding from 
day one. That's not basis on which the Loan Committee approved the 
funds. To agree to your client’s request, the Bank would need a new credit 
approval. I’m not sure your client wants to go that route. The Loan 
Committee might well deny your client’s request and question the wisdom 
of its initial approval. 
Borrower's lawyer: But that analysis isn’t right in this instance. 
This isn’t a straight-up revolver. In our deal, at the end of three years, any 
outstanding principal converts into a five-year term loan. Why shouldn’t 
the Borrower be able to use it earlier for a long-term investment? 
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Lender's lawyer: That’s a nice argument, but, real world, I 
can't see the Bank agreeing in advance that whenever the credit line has 
funds available to draw down, the Borrower can make such a significant 
change in its business model. 
Borrower's lawyer: Ok. I think my client will understand the 
Bank’s reluctance to give preapproval, but the president of the company 
feels that all these negative covenants are constraining his ability to run 
the company profitably. He’s afraid that all the prohibitions will tie his 
hands and that the company will lose an opportunity to make a good 
strategic buy. He keeps telling me that he has to report to shareholders.  
I think it would bring the concern level down if we could modify 
the covenant to say that all acquisitions are prohibited, except with the 
Bank’s consent. I would hope that the Bank would be okay with that. 
From a practical perspective, with or without the consent provision, my 
client still needs to come to the Bank and get a piece of paper if it wants 
to do an acquisition. If we leave the covenant as is, my client will have to 
ask for a waiver. And if we add the exception, my client will still have to 
come to the Bank for a piece of paper, but this time it will be called a 
consent. So, even with the exception, the Bank really is in the same 
position of control. 
Lender's lawyer: I'm afraid it’s not quite so simple. In this 
jurisdiction, whenever a party has discretionary authority, the common law 
reads in a reasonableness requirement. Specifically, the party must exercise 
its discretionary authority reasonably. 
Borrower's lawyer: Based on the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing? 
Lender's lawyer: Exactly. The Bank has been through this 
before. I ran this issue through the general counsel's office previously. 
They have decided as a matter of policy not to agree to consent exceptions. 
They view the exception as an open invitation to a borrower to litigate 
whether the Bank exercised its discretion reasonably. It’s simply Bank 
policy to refuse these requests. 
Variation 3 
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Borrower’s lawyer: When I spoke to my client about this 
provision, it was hoping that the Bank could have some flexibility and not 
prohibit all acquisitions. 
Lender's lawyer: What does your client have in mind?  
Borrower's lawyer: Well, it has been thinking that one way to 
grow the company would be through a strategic acquisition, especially if it 
would significantly improve its long-term profitability. 
Lender's lawyer: I can understand that your client might be 
interested in an acquisition, but the Bank agreed to lend short-term money 
for working capital, a short-term need. Agreeing that the Bank’s funds 
could be used to finance an acquisition creates a whole new credit risk 
profile. An acquisition transforms a revolver intended for short-term 
working capital needs into a long-term loan, money that will be 
outstanding from day one. That's not basis on which the Loan Committee 
approved the funds. To agree to your client’s request, the Bank would 
need a new credit approval. I’m not sure your client wants to go that route. 
There’s no way to guarantee that the Loan Committee wouldn’t deny your 
client’s request and question the wisdom of its initial approval. 
Borrower's lawyer: Ok. I understand that the money can’t be 
used immediately for an acquisition, but what about this as a possibility? 
What if the Bank agrees to let my client use the line for an acquisition 
during the last year of the three-year revolver? 
Lender's lawyer: Let me see if I understand what you’re 
saying. Currently, the deal is that at the end of the three years, any short-
term borrowings that are unpaid convert to a term loan. Are you asking 
that any amount of the credit line that’s not outstanding at the end of the 
third year be available to finance an acquisition? 
Borrower’s lawyer. Exactly. It’s the equivalent of our 
borrowing the full $25 million short-term and then having it convert to a 
term loan at the end of the three years.  
Lender’s lawyer: Not quite. But creative. I’m not sanguine, 
but I’ll run it by the Bank and get back to you. 
Commentary 
The first two variations are well within the expected zone of 
agreement for the negotiation of this provision. They are permutations on 
ways for the bank to say no and the borrower to accede. Because the bank 
has the money, it has the superior negotiating leverage. In this particular 
instance, the experienced borrower counsel knows that the request is likely 
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to be rejected and does not press the point when the expected rejection 
occurs.  
The request for a consent exception has not always resulted in a 
bank refusing a borrower’s request. Years ago, borrowers routinely 
requested such an exception, and bank lawyers considered agreeing to the 
request as a nonevent. The practical reality then was that agreeing to the 
consent did merely change the name of the piece of paper the bank might 
sign. But as more and more banks became entangled in litigation over 
whether a discretionary denial of consent was reasonable, banks began to 
deny the request. That said, the issue of reasonableness is a state law issue, 
and some banks are less risk averse and some borrowers more 
creditworthy than others. Therefore, borrowers continue to request 
consent exceptions. 
Banks have many ways to say no to a consent exception request. 
Another way a bank might demur is to say something like the following: 
“We can certainly understand why you might want to make an acquisition. 
If you find a good candidate, just let us know, and we’ll give it serious 
consideration then.” 
Although the request for a consent was nominally part of a zone 
of agreement negotiation, the ultimate resolution depended on the Bank’s 
lawyer knowing the legal effect of inserting the consent exception – a legal 
effect negotiation; one color of the rainbow merging into the next. Indeed, 
the negotiation was also a monetary negotiation (access to the money), an 
endgame negotiation (the right to borrow at the end of the revolver’s 
term), a risk negotiation (risk to bank of a change in the loan’s business 
purpose), and a control issue (borrower trying to wrest some control from 
the bank.) 
In Variation 3, borrower’s counsel’s request stepped outside the 
expected zone of agreement. He was trying to problem solve with a 
creative way to demonstrate to the bank that changing the purpose of the 
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loan would not increase its risk. The lawyer earns points for trying but, 
probably, will fail in his attempt.7 
D. Problem-Solving Negotiations 
A problem-solving negotiation addresses the multiplicity of issues that 
parties must resolve to implement a fundamental business term. Although 
the parties may have agreed in concept to a specific business term, each 
party must be confident that the memorialization of that term both 
minimizes its risks and advances its interests. In many instances, to do so, 
the lawyers must negotiate a subsidiary set of business terms, each part of 
the constellation of terms that will compose the business deal. Because of 
the multiple issues so often in play, these negotiations are often 
integrative—to use classic negotiation theory terminology. 
Factual background 
A licensor and licensee have agreed that in the first year of a three-
year term, the licensee will have the exclusive right to manufacture and 
market licensed products in States A, B, and C. Then, if sales exceed $7 
million in the first year, the territory will expand to include States D and 
E.  
                                               
7 The banks emphatically demonstrated their superior negotiating leverage in the 1980s 
when some loan agreements included end of the world provisions, with language such as the 
following: “[I]n the event that the end of the world shall be divinely inspired, then, in 
such event, Borrower further agrees that Bank shall be aligned with forces of goodness 
and light, and Borrower shall be aligned with the forces of evil and darkness, and that 
Borrower shall be cast into a pit of fire, and shall deliver unto Bank as an indentured 
servant Borrower’s first born, until all sums owing under the Loan Documents . . .” Yes. 
The banks would remove the provision, if requested. Original on record with the author. 
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Here is contract language that expressly incorporates the parties’ 
stated agreement. 
 
 
Licensee’s lawyer: Thanks for getting us the draft of the contract 
so quickly. We really appreciate the turnaround time. I have a couple of 
points that I’d like to talk through with you with respect to the grant of 
the license and its exclusivity. The first point is fairly basic. In the grant, 
the contract uses the word “sales.” That, of course, is an accounting term 
and on its own is too vague. I suggest that the finance people get together 
and work out a definition. I think that could eliminate problems down the 
road. 
Licensor’s lawyer: Absolutely. Good suggestion. What else is on 
your list? 
Definitions 
“Original Territory” means Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont. 
“Extended Territory” means Delaware, 
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
The grant of the license  
2.1 Grant of License. By signing this 
Agreement, the Licensor grants the Licensee an 
exclusive license to manufacture and sell Licensed 
Products, during the Term, in the Original Territory. 
However, if the Licensee’s sales for the first year of the 
Term exceed $7 million, this exclusive license is in the 
Extended Territory for the second and third years of 
the Term. 
 
 
                  TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW      [Vol. 20  540
Licensee’s lawyer: As you know, exclusivity is very important for 
us. Without it, we can’t fully exploit the license. We wouldn’t be going into 
this deal if we had to compete with another company to sell Licensed 
Products in the territory. 
Licensor’s lawyer: Absolutely. That’s the business deal. What if 
we give you a rep and warranty that we haven’t granted any licenses to any 
person in the Original Territory? 
Licensee’s lawyer: That’s fine, but does that mean that you have 
granted licenses in the Extended Territory? 
Licensor’s lawyer: Well, in State D, there is a license. But it 
shouldn’t present a problem if your client meets the $7 million threshold 
because it terminates at the same time as the end of year one of the Term. 
Licensee’s lawyer: What about State E? 
Licensor’s lawyer: No existing license. 
Licensee’s lawyer: Ok. We’d like the agreement to reflect all that 
information. Can we get reps and warranties on all that? 
Licensor’s lawyer: Not a problem. What about the following 
language? My speedy, well-trained associate drafted it as we were talking.  
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Licensee’s lawyer: That’s very helpful, but I think that we still 
need additional comfort. The reps speak as of the day of signing. My client 
is still at risk that your client might in the future grant licenses that would 
then compete with its license. We’d like some protection against that. We 
drafted up some proposed language that we’d like you to look at. 
 
3.1 New Licenses with respect to the Extended 
Territory. The Licensor shall not grant any license for the 
manufacture and sale of Licensed Products in the Extended 
Territory for all or any part of the Term.  
 
2.2 Other Licenses Granted.  
(a) Original Territory. The Licensor has not 
granted any other license for the manufacture 
and sale of Licensed Products in the Original 
Territory for all or any part of the Term.  
(b) States D and E. The Licensor has granted one 
license for the manufacture and sale of Licensed 
Products in State D. That license terminates on 
the last day of the Term’s first year. The 
Licensor has not granted any license for the 
manufacture and sale of Licensed Products in 
State E for all or any part of the Term.  
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Licensor’s lawyer: Let me talk this through with you. I think 
we’re going to need to distinguish licenses in the Original Territory and 
the additional states in the Extended Territory. A covenant prohibiting 
any other licenses with respect to the Original Territory makes sense as 
that is the Licensee’s exclusive territory throughout the Term. But States 
D and E are a little more complicated. My client may want to make some 
money from a license in State E between now and the end of the first year 
of the Term. 
Licensee’s lawyer: Yes. I can see that as a possibility. What if 
there’s permission to grant a license for Year 1? That would leave Years 2 
and 3 available to become part of the Extended Territory. 
Licensor’s lawyer: We’d prefer to have the discretionary 
authority to grant a license for more than Year 1, but then to be obligated 
to terminate that license if your client reaches the $7 million threshold. 
Our concern is that we want to have a license in place if your client doesn’t 
reach the threshold. If we don’t have a pre-existing deal, we could lose 
millions of dollars in sales while we negotiate an agreement for Years 2 
and 3 with another licensee. 
Licensee’s lawyer: So, if I understand your proposal, your 
contract with the other licensee would include your client having the right 
and the obligation to terminate that license if my client reaches the $7 
million threshold.  
Licensor’s lawyer: Yes, that’s correct.  
Licensee’s lawyer: I understand what you’re proposing, but I’m 
not comfortable with the other licensee’s term being tied to my client’s 
reaching the threshold. First, I don’t want to be litigating with the other 
licensee who has a right to be licensee in State E because of an accounting 
issue regarding whether we did or did not reach the threshold. Second, 
this arrangement raises at least the theoretical specter of the other licensee 
asserting a claim against my client for tortious interference with its then-
existing license. I think we’d prefer for your client to have the absolute 
right to terminate that license at the end of Year 1. 
Licensor’s lawyer: I understand your concerns, but I’ll need to 
check that point with my client. But to keep things moving, let’s assume 
the other license is terminable on notice. In addition, we’ll include a 
provision in our contract with you that we are obligated to terminate the 
other license if you meet the $7 million threshold. Does that work in 
concept? 
Licensee’s lawyer: Yes. Thank you. One final point for 
discussion. We need to deal with State D and years 2 and 3 of the Term. 
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Licensor’s lawyer: What if we set it up the same way as with 
respect to State E, but have it apply with respect to just the last two years 
of the Term?  
Licensee’s lawyer: That should work. Thank you. We too have a 
speedy associate. Here’s her work detailing our agreement. 
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Licensor’s lawyer: One quick reaction. By stating “any Person” 
that seems to limit our ability to divide the license among several licensees. 
We may want different licensees for different years of the term. 
Licensee’s lawyer: Understood. We’ll deal with that in our 
redraft. 
3.2 Other Licenses with respect to the Original 
Territory. The Licensor shall not grant any license for the manufacture 
and sale of Licensed Products in the Original Territory for all or any part 
of the Term.  
3.3 Licenses with respect to States D and E.  
(a) State D. The Licensor may grant to any Person a 
license for the manufacture and sale of Licensed 
Products in State D for the second and third 
years of the Term. However, under that license, 
the Licensor is to have the discretionary authority 
to terminate that license in its entirety. The 
Licensor shall exercise that discretionary 
authority if the Licensee has the right to a license 
for the Extended Territory in accordance with 
Section 2.1. 
(b) State E. The Licensor may grant to any Person a 
license for the manufacture and sale of Licensed 
Products in State E for all or any part of the 
Term. However, under that license, the Licensor 
is to have the discretionary authority to terminate 
that license with respect to the second and third 
years of the Term. The Licensor shall exercise 
that discretionary authority if the Licensee has 
the right to a license for the Extended Territory 
in accordance with Section 2.1. 
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Commentary 
This negotiation primarily focused on how the lawyers were going 
to memorialize the parties’ agreement that the license was to be exclusive. 
Merely granting an exclusive license would not have carried out the parties’ 
intent. By asking the right questions, licensee’s lawyer discovered facts that 
might result in unwanted competition. Therefore, the lawyers needed to 
address those facts with a subsidiary set of business terms that they 
created. 
Part of the negotiation was necessarily a translation negotiation. 
When the licensee’s lawyer discovered an existing license, she wanted the 
contract to reflect that that license existed and that it was the only existing, 
possibly competitive license. To do that, the lawyers agreed that the 
licensor would make representations and warranties. Then, covenants 
were needed to prohibit the granting of future licenses. But blanket 
prohibitions wouldn’t work, so the lawyers had to tailor the covenants to 
address the licensor’s interest in earning profits in the Extended Territory 
(an undeclared monetary negotiation). 
The last negotiation about the use of the noun Person was a classic 
legal effect negotiation. It was not a contract language negotiation because 
the licensor’s lawyer was not disputing the meaning of the defined term 
Person. Instead, the licensor’s lawyer raised the need to address the possible 
legal effect of its use. 
E. Translation Negotiations 
A translation negotiation focuses on which contract concepts a 
contract should use to memorialize the business terms to which the parties 
have agreed. The phrase translation negotiation derives from the deal lawyer’s 
core analytic skill, the translation skill. 
The translation skill differs from the analytic skill litigators use. 
Specifically, litigators begin their analysis by taking the law and applying it 
to the facts to create a persuasive argument. The litigation paradigm seeks 
a certain legal result by working backwards from the law to a static set of 
facts. The analytic skill of deal lawyers stands this paradigm on its head.  
Deal lawyers start from the business deal. The terms of the 
business deal are the deal lawyer’s facts. A lawyer must then find the 
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contract concepts that will best memorialize the business terms and use 
those concepts as the basis of drafting the appropriate contract provisions. 
I call this skill translating the business deal into contract concepts, or more 
succinctly, the translation skill. 8 
Contract concepts are not interchangeable. Each concept 
performs a different job and has a different consequence.9 Therefore, 
predictably, lawyers will disagree as to which concepts to use, each side 
seeking an advantage.  
***** 
The negotiation that follows begins with a truncated business 
term. It reflects the parties’ agreement as to an outcome they want. 
Therefore, to create the necessary contract provisions, the lawyers must 
engage in a contract language negotiation. But, as you will see, before even 
drafting a word, the lawyers must first negotiate how to translate the 
business term into contract concepts.  
Factual background 
Two principals have signed a letter of intent (the LOI) for the 
purchase of a business. They agree that all consents must be obtained 
before the buyer must close. Shortly afterwards, the buyer’s lawyer calls 
the seller’s lawyer to introduce himself and to discuss the LOI. Here is 
part of the call.  
***** 
Buyer’s lawyer: That brings us to the matter of consents. I'm sure 
in your review of the LOI you saw that our clients agreed that all consents 
were to be obtained. 
                                               
8 See Tina L. Stark, Contract Drafting: A Prerequisite to Teaching Transactional Negotiation, in a 
panel entitled Negotiations, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 162 (quoting from and paraphrasing pages 
163-164) (2011). 
9 For example, a representation is a statement of past or present fact as of a moment in time 
intended to induce reliance. If a party intentionally makes a false representation, it’s fraud. 
The injured party can sue for rescission and restitutionary recovery or, alternatively, 
damages (which may or may not be expectation damages). In contrast, a covenant is a 
promise to perform, a promise to do or not to do something. A covenant breach gives 
the nonbreaching party the right to sue for expectation damages.  
The other contract concepts are warranties, conditions, discretionary authority, and 
declarations. 
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Seller’s lawyer: Absolutely. That should be very simple to deal 
with. Let's make it a condition to closing. 
Buyer’s lawyer: All right. That's helpful, but I think we need some 
additional provisions. If we deal with the consent issue only through a 
condition, that practically gives you an option not to close. If your client 
wants out of the deal, it just fails to get a consent. We want the seller to 
be obligated to put out effort to get all those consents. What if we add a 
covenant that the seller shall obtain all the consents not obtained before 
signing? 
Seller’s lawyer: I understand your point about the seller needing 
to exert effort, and we’re happy to covenant to do that. But the seller can’t 
promise to obtain all the consents. The seller doesn't control the parties 
who need to give consent. The seller can't be in a position where a third 
party controls whether the seller has breached the purchase agreement. 
Buyer’s lawyer: Fair enough. Let's provide that the seller shall use 
commercially reasonable efforts, so the issue is the level of exertion, rather 
than the success of the efforts. 
Buyer’s lawyer: I don’t think that’s a problem. I’ll confirm that 
with my client. 
Seller’s lawyer: Good. We can mark that business term “Done.” 
Buyer’s lawyer: Not quite. Before we sign on for this deal, we 
want to understand what risks we are taking with respect to the consents. 
Which consents have you obtained and which do you need to get? We’d 
like you to lay that out for us. We need to determine if there’s a consent 
that you’re unlikely to get. If so, my client may not want to pursue this 
deal.  
Seller’s lawyer: Not a problem. We’ll give you a rep and warranty 
disclosing all that information. The covenant and the condition will tie it 
all together: The rep and warranty will tell the buyer what consents the 
seller has and doesn’t have. The covenant will obligate the seller to use 
commercially reasonable efforts to obtain the consents that it doesn’t 
have. And, finally, the condition will give the buyer the right not to close 
if the seller doesn’t obtain all the consents. 
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Buyer’s lawyer: Now we’re done. I look forward to working with 
you. 
Commentary 
This negotiation demonstrates the salience of the translation 
negotiation. Had the buyer’s lawyer not negotiated for the interlocking use 
of three contract concepts (representations and warranties, covenants, and 
conditions), the contract would have left the buyer at risk. 
This negotiation easily could have had an additional component 
of a risk allocation negotiation. After the Buyer’s lawyer proposed a 
commercially reasonable efforts standard, the seller’s lawyer could have 
begun a mini-contract language/risk allocation negotiation by trying to 
define that standard. For example, the seller could have asked for a 
provision that commercially reasonable efforts did not require the seller 
to spend more than $10,000. 
F. Legal Effect Negotiations 
Legal effect negotiations are any negotiation that turns on the legal 
meaning or consequence of a contractual term.  
What follows is a simple negotiation about the mode of giving 
notice that centers on the legal effect of a suggested business term. Most 
legal effect negotiations are far more complex because they concern issues 
far more subtle. 
Factual background 
Sally Seller has agreed to sell her 2007 red Toyota Camry hybrid to 
Bob Buyer for $4,500. Sally has agreed to allow Bob to have a licensed 
New York mechanic inspect the car. In terms of logistics, Bob will pick 
the mechanic, but Sally will drive the car to the mechanic’s garage for the 
inspection. One final issue remains: notice to Sally of when and where the 
inspection will take place.  
***** 
Seller's lawyer: If Sally is to drive the car to the mechanic’s garage, 
she’ll need notice about when and where. She has a new business and she 
can’t promise to be available with only fifteen minutes’ notice.  
Buyer's lawyer: That's reasonable. How about no less than 
twenty-four hours’ notice?  
Seller’s lawyer: That works. 
Buyer's lawyer: Do you care how the notice is delivered to her? 
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Seller’s lawyer: Preferably, e-mail followed by a phone call. 
Buyer's lawyer: I would prefer it be one or the other. If it’s both, 
we create ambiguity as to what constitutes receipt of the notice. If it’s 
receipt of the e-mail, then the phone call is redundant. And if it’s the phone 
call, then there’s no point to the e-mail. 
Seller’s lawyer: I see your point. Make it e-mail to her, with a 
courtesy copy to me.  
Buyer’s lawyer: Will do. 
Commentary 
This negotiation demonstrates how a seemingly innocuous term 
can inadvertently become a trap for the unwary. The double notice had 
the legal effect of creating an ambiguity as to when the notice became 
effective.  
For another simple example of a legal effect negotiation, please 
look at the negotiation about the effect of using Person in the problem-solving 
negotiation exemplar. 
G. Logistics Negotiations 
A logistics negotiation refers to a negotiation intended to detail the 
interactive mechanics necessary to memorialize the parties’ intent with 
respect to a business term. In a typical deal, the parties present the lawyers 
with a desired outcome (the business term), but rarely the path to achieve 
that outcome. That path is for the lawyers to create, sometimes out of 
whole cloth. A logistics negotiation is process-oriented. The end-result will 
reflect the various business issues that surface as the lawyers negotiate. 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, a logistics negotiation often implicates other 
categories of negotiations, such as translation, contract language, and legal 
effect negotiations.  
 
Examples of logistic negotiations are the following: 
• Negotiation of the contractual mechanics to exercise a 
right of first refusal in a shareholders’ agreement. 
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• Negotiation of the contractual mechanics for choosing 
arbitrators. 
• Negotiation of the contractual mechanics for making a 
post-closing indemnity claim. 
• Negotiation of the contractual mechanics for approving a 
licensed product. 
Factual background 
Sally Seller has agreed to sell her 2007 red Toyota Camry hybrid to 
Bob Buyer for $4,500. The only other term the parties discussed was the 
car’s condition. Sally described it as in “good shape.” Bob took the car for 
a test drive, and he thought that it seemed to run well. Ever cautious, 
though, he told Sally that he might want to have it inspected. Sally agreed 
that was reasonable. 
The parties didn't sign anything to reflect their deal, but they 
described it to their respective lawyers in the same way. Bob’s lawyer 
drafted a short contract that paraphrased the business terms Bob had 
recited.  
Mechanic's Inspection. The Buyer may have the Car 
inspected at any time before the Closing. The Car must be in good 
working order on the Closing Date. 
The Buyer’s lawyer sent that draft to the Seller’s lawyer, which led 
to the following phone call: 
Buyer's lawyer: Hello Margie. How are you? It's been a long time 
since we’ve done a deal together. This should be an easy one.  
Seller's lawyer: I'm fine. Thanks for asking. As to the deal, I think 
that once we address the inspection provision, we’ll be good to go. I know 
the clients didn't discuss the logistics of the inspection, but I think we 
should clarify several points now, so they don't have any disputes later. 
Buyer’s lawyer: Of course, what's on your mind? 
Seller's lawyer: Well, there are a few things. First, I’d like the 
agreement to require that the person inspecting the car be a mechanic 
licensed in New York. Sally shouldn’t have to worry that Bob’s college 
buddy is going to inspect the car and then suggest a price decrease for 
some engine problems only he can find. 
Buyer’s lawyer: Fine. That’s fair. 
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Seller’s lawyer: Second, as you know, Sally has had a lot of 
interest in the car, and she doesn't want it to be off the market for a long 
time. So, it would be helpful if Bob could agree to have the inspection 
performed no later than four business days after signing. Along the same 
lines, we’d like Bob to agree to tell Sally the business day after the 
inspection whether the car passed inspection, and, if not, why not. That 
way, the two of them can either find a way to address the car’s problems 
quickly or Sally can get the car back on the market without unnecessary 
delay. 
Buyer’s lawyer: All perfectly reasonable. 
Seller’s lawyer: While we’re working through the logistics, we 
should make the inspection convenient for Sally. 
Buyer’s lawyer: What if I redraft the contract so it provides that 
the mechanic's garage must be within a 10-mile radius of her house? But 
I’d also like the agreement to provide that Sally will drive the car to the 
mechanic. Bob shouldn’t have to do that. I’m uncomfortable putting him 
at risk for potential liabilities if an accident occurred while he was driving 
the car to or from the mechanic’s garage. 
Seller’s lawyer: Done.  
Commentary  
The principals in this transaction agreed to bare-bone terms. They 
left open all the logistical terms, the terms which superficially dealt with 
who, what, when, and where. The quotidian nature of these terms masked 
underlying risks that the lawyers teased out as they negotiated how the 
inspection would come to pass. 
H. Contract Language Negotiations 
Contract language negotiations focus on word choice and the ensuing 
business and legal consequences. A contract language negotiation 
ineluctably occurs concurrently with other implementation negotiations. 
To state the obvious, drafting a provision requires the drafter to choose 
which words to use to memorialize a business term. Therefore, any 
implementation negotiation of that provision necessarily implicates the 
words being used and, therefore, involves contract language negotiation.  
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The first example depicts a negotiation relating to ambiguity, while 
the second example describes how drafting a definition can have strategic 
consequences and affect the business deal.  
Example 1 - Factual background 
The following provision is from a lease agreement. 
Term. This Agreement continues in force for a 
period of five years from the date it is made, and thereafter 
for successive five-year terms, unless and until terminated 
by one-year prior notice in writing by either party. 
Here is the negotiation between the Landlord’s and the Tenant’s 
lawyers.  
Landlord’s lawyer: Tom, thanks for coming to our offices for 
all the negotiations on this deal. It’s nice to do face-to-face negotiations 
for a change, rather than online dueling mark-ups. 
Tenant’s lawyer: I agree. I’ve come by for one last issue. I’d 
like to discuss the provision dealing with the term of the lease. I know 
we’ve looked at it before, but in my final review I found something we 
should talk about. I want to make sure our clients are on the same page as 
to how the renewal terms work. 
Landlord’s lawyer: What’s the issue? 
Tenant’s lawyer: Well, we understand the deal to have three 
moving parts. First, is an initial five-year term. Second, after that initial 
term ends, a series of successive five-year terms begins. Third, and finally, 
each party has a right to terminate any of the successive five-year terms. 
But that right doesn’t apply to the first term. Is that your understanding? 
Landlord’s lawyer: Exactly. 
Tenant’s lawyer: I’m glad we agree on that, but I think that 
someone could misinterpret the provision. The unless clause muddies the 
meaning. Given that it immediately follows the successive term clause, 
arguably, it modifies and applies to only that clause. That said, I can see 
someone arguing that it also modifies the initial term, so that each party 
additionally has the right to terminate the initial term before its end. If you 
agree, I think it would help if we clarify the language. 
Landlord’s lawyer: I do agree, and nice catch. What if we 
create two sentences? The first would address just the initial term. The 
second would address the successive terms and each party’s right to 
terminate any of those terms with one year’s notice. That should clarify 
that the right to terminate speaks only to the successive terms. 
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Tenant’s lawyer: Sounds good. 
Landlord’s lawyer: Let me input those changes before you 
leave. [Pause] It’s coming out of the printer now. What do you think?  
Term. This Agreement continues in force for a 
period of five years from the date it is made. After the 
initial term, the Agreement continues in force for 
successive five-year terms, unless and until terminated by 
one-year prior notice in writing by either party.  
Tenant’s lawyer: Great. Maybe the rest of the provision 
can be fixed up one day. 
Landlord’s lawyer: Don’t hold your breath. 
 
Example 2 – Factual background 
Negotiating and drafting definitions is not a client-neutral 
endeavor. A definition establishes a standard, and that standard may favor 
one party over the other. For example, consider the two definitions of 
Force Majeure Event that follow. Variation 1, the litany, favors the party 
most likely to be the performing party. The litany circumscribes the events 
that will excuse performance to those explicitly listed in the litany. If an 
event is not included, the nonperforming party will not be excused from 
performing, and the failure to perform will constitute breach.  
In contrast, Variation 2 establishes a multi-prong test. No event is 
an expressly stated Force Majeure Event. Instead, in each instance, the 
nonperforming party must demonstrate that a particular act or event 
meets the criteria of the three-prong test. Unquestionably, demonstrating 
that an act or event meets the multi-prong test criteria is more onerous 
than the litany, especially if the relevant act or event would ordinarily be 
included in a litany. Nonetheless, the multi-prong test provides a flexible 
standard, giving the nonperforming party, in each instance, the 
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opportunity to establish that an act or event falls within the defined term’s 
orbit. 10   
 
Commentary 
A contract language negotiation comprises, at minimum, all 
negotiations involving ambiguity, style, definitions, clarity, and legal effect. 
A successful implementation negotiation requires an acute sensitivity to 
each word’s denotation and connotation. 
                                               
10 Both definitions are excerpted from Nancy F. Persechino, Force Majeure, in Negotiating 
and Drafting Contract Boilerplate 201-202 (Tina L. Stark et al. eds. ALM Publg. 2003). 
Variation 1 
Force Majeure Event means war, flood, 
lightning, drought, earthquake, fire, volcanic eruption, 
landslide, cyclone, typhoon, tornado, explosion eruption, 
civil disturbance, act of God or the public enemy, terrorist 
act, military action, epidemic, famine or plague, 
shipwreck, action of a court or public authority, or strike. 
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VI. TEACHING IMPLEMENTATION NEGOTIATION 
To teach students to emulate the integrative thought process of 
implementation negotiation, we must begin by giving them an overview 
of classic negotiation theory. Our teaching must then turn to the 
foundation knowledge unique to transactions: the translation skill and the 
basics of contract drafting.  
 
Variation 2 
As used in this Agreement, a "Force Majeure Event" 
means any act or event, whether foreseen or unforeseen, that meets 
each of the tests in subsections (a) through (c). 
(a) It prevents a party (the "Nonperforming Party"), in whole or in part,  
(i) from performing its obligations under this Agreement or 
(ii) satisfying any conditions to the Performing Party’s 
obligations under this Agreement. 
(b) It is beyond the reasonable control of and not the fault of the 
Nonperforming Party. 
(c) The Nonperforming Party has been unable to avoid or overcome the 
act or event by the exercise of due diligence. 
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As my other writings evidence,11 I believe that contract drafting 
requires a broad range of knowledge and skills. Nonetheless, it’s unrealistic 
to require all students who want to learn implementation negotiation to 
master contract drafting through a separate course. Do I think that such 
mastery would enhance a student’s ability to engage in implementation 
negotiation? Yes. But is it likely that schools will require a contract drafting 
course as a prerequisite to one that includes implementation negotiation? 
No. Therefore, through trial and error, we will need to learn how much—
or how little—drafting expertise students will need before they can 
successfully learn implementation negotiation.  
Despite the need for some mastery of contract drafting before 
taking a course that includes implementation negotiation, students should 
still be able to experience implementation negotiation in their 1L year. 12 
By teaching students how to translate the business deal into contract 
concepts, they can learn the deal lawyer’s salient analytical skill and, 
therefore, gain the opportunity to engage in translation negotiation 
exercises. In addition, if drafted properly, a contract language negotiation 
can focus on ambiguity, a concept with which students will be familiar 
after studying interpretation.  
I do not expect that students will be sophisticated negotiators by 
the time they finish a course that teaches implementation negotiation. 
Students must learn too much in too short a time. But learning any skill is 
a reiterative process. So, once a student learns the fundamentals in law 
school, progression to mastery will be part of that student’s growth as a 
practitioner. 
As part of teaching this new theory of negotiation, we must 
recognize that most existing transactional negotiating exercises do not 
depict realistic implementation negotiation scenarios. Instead, they 
emulate distributive, deal term negotiations: How many years is a non-
compete; what is its geographic scope? As I hope this presentation has 
clarified, principals generally negotiate these issues, not lawyers. To teach 
this distinctive negotiation theory, we will need distinctive simulations and 
exercises. Their creation will be integral to an effective pedagogy. 
                                               
11 See generally, Tina L. Stark, Drafting Contracts: How and Why Lawyers Do What They Do (2d 
ed. Wolters Kluwer 2014). 
12 It would help, of course, if professors taught the 1L Contracts course with a 
transactional perspective. Tina L. Stark, Transactional Skills Education: Mandated by the ABA 
Standards, 20 TENN. J. BUS. L. 693 (2018). 
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VII. IMPLEMENTATION NEGOTIATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION LAWYERING 
In this presentation, I have described implementation negotiation, 
a new negotiation framework that I intend to expand and refine. I look 
forward to others joining in this endeavor, adding their insights and 
expertise. 
I also look forward to describing how implementation negotiation 
is itself part of a broader framework—a way of conceptualizing the totality 
of skills and tasks13 that are a transactional lawyer’s bailiwick. I have 
dubbed that framework implementation lawyering. The best deal lawyers close 
the deal. They do what needs to get done, whether its structuring the 
transaction, advising on the law, interviewing or counseling the client, 
drafting or reviewing a contract, organizing an entity, performing due 
diligence, collaborating with their counterparts, being a confidant, 
negotiating the business deal, creating value, participating in an 
implementation negotiation, or photocopying closing documents. The 
business people agree on the deal, and the deal lawyers implement it. 
                                               
13 Tina L. Stark, My Fantasy Curriculum and Other Almost Random Thoughts (distinguishing 
skills from tasks), 9 TENN. J. BUS. L. 3 (2009). 
